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REVIEW ARTICLE
The European Court of Justice and its political impact
Michael Blaubergera and Susanne K. Schmidtb
asalzburg centre of european union studies, university of salzburg, salzburg, austria; binstitute 
for political science, university of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
ABSTRACT
This article reviews recent advances in the study of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) and its political impact at the European and member state levels. New 
quantitative as well as qualitative analyses show with great empirical precision 
that member state preferences guide the Court. The article summarises these 
findings, but argues that greater attention needs to be given to the (over-)
constitutionalisation of EU law in order to fully capture the political impact of ECJ 
jurisprudence. Even if European judges are less activist than is often assumed and 
individual decisions are more restrained in the face of member state opposition, 
incrementally, case law evolves in a highly expansive fashion. And, exercising 
caution regarding unrealistic expectations about quasi-deterministic judicial 
law-making, it is found that the Court’s constitutionalised jurisprudence impacts 
heavily on European and member state policy-making.
KEYWORDS european court of Justice; case law; policy making; judicial activism; europeanisation
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has long been hailed as an independent 
motor of European integration. Yet recent work has shown with great empirical 
precision how much the Court is conditioned by member state preferences. 
Quantitative studies have analysed the influence of member state observations 
on the Court’s jurisprudence (Carrubba and Gabel 2015; Carrubba et al. 2008; 
Larsson and Naurin 2016), and qualitative case studies have traced political 
corrections in response to ECJ case law (Martinsen 2015a). Other leading schol-
ars have questioned the empirical validity of these claims (Davies 2016; Stone 
Sweet and Brunell 2012). In this review essay, we enquire into the theoretical 
significance of recent empirical work on the ECJ. What are the implications for 
our understanding of the political system of the EU if the Court can be shown 
to pay due regard to the preferences of the member states?
The long debate between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism gives 
us a misleading answer. A court paying tribute to member state preferences, 
we claim, is not necessarily a court having little impact. This answer would 
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overlook the roots of the Court’s impact: the direct effect and supremacy of the 
EU Treaties. These doctrines, established in the 1960s, effectively transformed 
the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty into a constitution, in all but 
name. But an intergovernmental treaty makes for a very special constitutional 
framework. While core elements of traditional constitutions, such as rule of law 
principles and fundamental rights, remain underdeveloped, the EU Treaties 
are replete with detailed policy goals. The former German constitutional judge 
Dieter Grimm has coined the term ‘over-constitutionalisation’ for the unusual 
nature of the EU’s Treaties (Grimm 2016).1 We argue, in line with his analy-
sis, that only by reflecting ‘over-constitutionalisation’ can we understand the 
broader impact of the Court. Interpreting a treaty with detailed policy pre-
scriptions, the Court’s rulings have direct implications for policy-making at the 
European and domestic levels. And due to the unanimity rule for treaty changes, 
overruling the ECJ is even more difficult than in the context of national consti-
tutional jurisprudence. This prevalence of non-majoritarian decision-making 
in the EU is emphasised by Grimm’s analysis.
In the following, we summarise the recent work on the Court and ask what 
over-constitutionalisation means for the political system of the EU and its mem-
ber states. We start by discussing studies that show a considerable congruence 
between the Court’s rulings and member state preferences. Such a narrow 
focus on Court restraints in individual disputes, however, fails to capture the 
expansive evolution of case law over time. We then turn to the few studies that 
systematically analyse the Court’s impact on legislative politics, and on this 
basis emphasise the importance of over-constitutionalisation.
Judicial restraint vs expansive case law
Recent quantitative studies have found significant effects of member state polit-
ical signals on ECJ case law (Carrubba and Gabel 2015; Larsson and Naurin 
2016). Carrubba and Gabel mainly base their study on the summaries of mem-
ber state interventions that were published until 1994 (Carrubba and Gabel 
2015: 70). Larsson et al. received access via the Swedish Foreign Ministry to 
more recent, unpublished summary reports of member state written observa-
tions and compiled a dataset for the period between 1997 and 2008 (Larsson 
and Naurin 2016: 392). Both groups of authors coded member state positions 
and ECJ rulings in order to assess to what extent the Court follows or violates 
member state preferences.
The two studies analyse distinct mechanisms: legislative override, which 
requires collective action at the EU level (Larsson and Naurin 2016), and 
non-compliance, which results from unilateral action at the domestic level 
(Carrubba and Gabel 2015). The underlying logic, however, is very similar: 
by submitting written observations to ongoing cases, member state govern-
ments threaten countervailing measures at the European or national levels 
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against unwelcome rulings. Larsson and Naurin (2016: 382) argue that judges 
are influenced by the perceived risk of legislative override. And Carrubba and 
Gabel (2015: 45) hold that the Court only tends to interpret EU law expansively 
if the domestic costs of compliance are not getting too high and member state 
governments do not threaten to infringe European rules. In sum, according 
to the findings of these authors, the Court is more restrained than previously 
acknowledged when faced with strong member state opposition.
Apart from the Court’s limited ability to engage in judicial activism, Larsson 
and Naurin also find little evidence for any political bias of ECJ judges that 
would go against member state preferences. Unsurprisingly, the Court and the 
Commission are found to be systematically more pro-European than member 
states – in particular, when EU governments disagree on political-economic 
grounds (Larsson and Naurin 2015: 24f.). However, ECJ judges do not appear 
to lean towards any particular liberal or social welfare model or variety of 
capitalism, but rather position themselves in between these different models 
(Larsson and Naurin 2015: 10–27).
What does this most impressive empirical work imply for the importance of 
the Court and its case law? If its rulings reflect intergovernmental preferences, 
if ‘everything happens conditionally on implicit government acquiescence’ 
(Carrubba and Gabel 2015: 213), can we still call the Court a motor of inte-
gration? In her recent book, Karen Alter (2014: 338) argues that it ‘would be 
surprising indeed’ if ‘judges systematically and generally ignore[d] government 
opinion’. And yet, even in the light of the empirical data discussed above, we 
should not entirely dismiss the possibility of ECJ activism that goes beyond 
governments’ preferences (i). Even more importantly, Court activism is just 
one way towards ‘integration through law’. This is also one of the main findings 
of an edited volume of eminent legal scholars, namely that ‘understanding 
judicial activism involves looking well beyond the decisions of the European 
Court themselves and into the very foundations of the EU’ (Muir et al. 2013: 
9). Rather than focusing narrowly on the Court and individual activist judg-
ments, we therefore argue that greater attention has to be given to the ways in 
which the Court’s case law expands incrementally over time (ii) and assumes 
relevance erga omnes (iii).
(i) Can interventions of governments be assumed to truly reflect their prefer-
ences? Carrubba and Gabel as well as Larsson and Naurin assume that govern-
ments rationally intervene in all those cases that matter to them. However, case 
studies show that this is not necessarily true, and governments do not always 
intervene, although rulings affect them (Obermaier 2008: 23–5). Possibly they 
are not aware of the implications of court cases arising in other member states. 
It is difficult for governments to assess the consequences of all possible turns 
that a ruling could take, as it is to assess how a ruling could favour or hamper 
future policy choices. Or governments may hope that their infraction of EU law 
will not come to light if they keep quiet. Interventions into cases thus mirror 
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political salience only incompletely. In addition, preferences of governments 
are fluid, not only when accounting for governmental changes. Within coali-
tion governments, there are frequently differing policy preferences. As the EU 
often serves purposes of blame avoidance, not all rulings which imply shifts in 
domestic policy are necessarily unwelcome. But even if governments concur in 
court-driven changes, this does not necessarily imply that these changes could 
have found domestic majorities without the Court. Government briefs, thus, 
do not simply mirror the extent of accepted domestic policy change. In sum, 
the Court may rule against incumbent governments to a greater extent than is 
acknowledged in existing studies based on member state written observations.
(ii) How are Court rulings linked to policy change? Transformative change 
need not be abrupt, but may evolve incrementally (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 9). 
In this respect, the Court’s high case load allows for many small steps. Hence, 
even if the ECJ balances all claims cautiously and, by and large, respects strong 
member state objections in its rulings, its case law may develop a highly expan-
sive effect over time. To capture this expansive effect, we need to analyse lines 
of jurisprudence rather than individual rulings. Moreover, it is necessary to 
account for the qualitative importance of legal issues. The Court may back down 
on a high number of relatively insignificant issues, while significant changes 
might result from the minority of issues in which the Court decides against 
member states. In this respect, the field’s neglect of over-constitutionalisation, 
as emphasised by Grimm (2016), is relevant. In interpreting the Treaties, the 
Court may lock in certain policies, while precluding other policy options at 
the domestic and the European levels. Legal scholars are aware of the problem 
of overly constraining precedent, which only allows future deviations at the 
price of legal incoherence. Constitutional courts, Mark Dawson argues, ‘not 
only rule … on the compatibility of legislation with constitutional rules but 
must take responsibility for imagining future alternatives. This is certainly a 
responsibility which the European Courts do not seem to consider themselves 
bound’ (Dawson 2013: 20). The lock-in effect is even more severe for political 
decision-makers, since they cannot overrule constitutionalised case law. For 
example, when discussing the Services Directive in the mid-2000s, national 
treatment was not an option the European Parliament could pursue, as past 
case law on the freedom to provide services precluded such a restrictive inter-
pretation (Schmidt 2015). Thus, Court rulings may largely conform to govern-
mental preferences at the time when they are adopted – but they also constrain 
subsequent governments with potentially divergent preferences and, due to its 
constitutional status, case law can hardly be changed politically.
(iii) Finally, we need to consider the erga omnes relevance of Court jurispru-
dence. Courts decide disputes and the studies discussed above treat individual 
disputes as their unit of analysis. Assessing winners and losers for individual 
cases implicitly brings in the assumption that case law is only relevant inter 
partes, as is common in international law. If this was the case in the EU as 
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well, we could clearly pinpoint the odds of member states having to live with 
the Court being more integrationist. According to Larsson and Naurin (2016: 
395), in 57% of the cases, member states support the Court on the ‘more Europe 
dimension’. The relevance of an ECJ ruling, however, is not restricted to the 
dispute at hand, since it has erga omnes effect. Once the Court clarifies a legal 
matter, this ruling is valid throughout the EU, and takes direct effect for national 
administrations, for the EU and member states’ legislatures, as well as for mem-
ber state courts. In fact, the significant work of Derlén and Lindholm (2014, 
2015) and Larsson et al. (2016) using network analysis shows the importance 
of precedent for the legal argumentation of the Court. As the interpretation of 
the Court is intended to settle the meaning of European law once and for all, 
it becomes more difficult to assess what it implies that in 43% of the cases it is 
at least not clear whether member states support the Court.
In sum, focusing on the interaction between member state governments and 
the Court only gives a partial answer about the importance of the Court. Given 
the erga omnes effect of rulings, we have to look beyond individual disputes 
to analyse how case law constrains member states. In this context, it is par-
ticularly relevant that over-constitutionalisation implies that in many disputes 
concerning policy the Court refers to the Treaty next to secondary law. As is 
the case for national constitutional courts, interpretations of the constitution 
become part of the constitution. Accordingly, if the ECJ interprets the four 
freedoms, EU citizenship, or European competition law in a certain way, the 
political institutions of the EU and its member states cannot deviate from this 
interpretation of supreme EU law. We now turn to the question of how case 
law shapes policy-making.
False expectations vs real impact
From a Political Science perspective, the question about how courts decide is 
particularly relevant because of their impact on policy-making. Ultimately, the 
yardstick against which to measure the importance of the ECJ in the process of 
integration is whether ‘its considerations and doctrines become incorporated 
in the policy-making process’ and whether ‘the Court can promote distinct 
European policies and eventually shape legislation outcomes’ (Wasserfallen 
2010: 1129). Surprisingly, Political Science research on the (legislative) impact 
of the Court is scarce. It is here that Dorte Martinsen’s (2015a) book breaks new 
ground. In the following, we focus on the Court’s influence on (i) EU legisla-
tion and (ii) domestic legislation, and outline suggestions for further research.
(i) At the European level, the influence of Court jurisprudence on EU legisla-
tion is largely overlooked. Individual policy studies have repeatedly shown a sig-
nificant impact of the Court’s case law, in particular when used instrumentally 
by the Commission, e.g. to establish mutual recognition (Alter and Meunier-
Aitsahalia 1994), to push liberalisation (Schmidt 2000), and to regulate defence 
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procurement (Blauberger and Weiss 2013). In the general field of EU legislative 
studies, however, researchers tend to ignore the implications of case law. An 
example is the seminal book by Robert Thomson (2011) on the Council of 
Ministers. Being the result of one of the largest empirical exercises in EU studies, 
analysing the preferences of member states in EU decision-making, the index 
does not even contain an entry for the Court. Though over-constitutionalisa-
tion implies that the Commission’s proposals for secondary law often consist 
of codification of case law, the field of EU legislative studies ignores this.
In her recent book, Dorte Martinsen (2015a, for an overview of major find-
ings, see also Martinsen 2015b) tackles this huge gap and provides the most 
comprehensive and systematic study on the ECJ’s legislative impact to date. 
In a nutshell, Martinsen develops a taxonomy of legislative responses to the 
Court’s case law and analyses systematically the conditions of judicial influ-
ence on more than five decades of EU social policy-making. She concludes by 
rejecting any absolute claims about either a powerless or an ‘ever more powerful 
Court’: ‘Judicial influence is not a question of whether but a question of degree’ 
(Martinsen 2015a: 236). This conclusion is supported by the empirical finding 
that member states hardly ever override the Court’s case law; they codify the 
case law mostly regarding technical issues; and they try to restrict the Court’s 
impact in more contested areas through ‘modification’ (Martinsen 2015a: 95–7).
In its systematic approach, Martinsen’s book sets a new standard and pro-
vides a blueprint for studying the ECJ’s legislative impact beyond social pol-
icy. Nevertheless, we have two important caveats. First, the taxonomy of EU 
legislative responses to ECJ case law would be even more convincing without 
the category of ‘modification’, since the latter ignores the fragmented nature 
of case law and blurs the distinction between override and codification. Case 
law is always about highly specific constellations and, therefore, necessarily 
fragmented rather than prescribing a full-fledged policy. Turning case-specific 
jurisprudence into general policy, then, does not amount to modification, but 
codification. Filling gaps left by and generalising from individual rulings is pre-
cisely what codification is about. This process always involves political signals 
as to whether existing case law should be interpreted more or less extensively 
in the future. And codification sometimes has a pre-emptive character when 
member states try to avoid further case law and regard political agreement on 
EU legislation as the ‘lesser evil’ (Schmidt 2000). In our view, such instances in 
which case law essentially pushes member states towards legislative agreement, 
however, are particularly strong examples of ECJ legislative influence rather 
than of ‘weak’ modification (Martinsen 2015a: 36). By contrast, if legislation 
truly contradicts the Court’s jurisprudence, this is not modification either, but 
should be correctly categorised as override. Gareth Davies has made a similar 
argument and provided a clear criterion to distinguish override and codifi-
cation, namely ‘whether the legislation says things which the Court, if asked, 
would disagree with’ (Davies 2016: 852).
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Secondly, the over-constitutionalisation of EU law explains EU mem-
ber states’ limited but differentiated ability to adopt legislative corrections. 
Overriding the Court’s jurisprudence via secondary legislation is impossible, 
if the former is based on an interpretation of the EU’s Treaties. In these cases, 
the ECJ’s ‘pro-integrative rulings are effectively insulated from member state 
override’ (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2012: 205); ‘the idea of “legislative override” 
is a myth’ (Davies 2016: 846). This is not to say that member states cannot signal 
their preferences to the Court – ex ante through written observations and ex 
post in the process of codification. Ultimately, however, it is up to the Court to 
be responsive or not: ‘the Court’s alignment to the other institutions, where it 
occurs, does so on an essentially voluntary/discretionary basis’ (Hatzopoulos 
2013). By contrast, the Court’s interpretation of EU secondary law can be 
undone or amended via corrective legislation (Davies 2016: 850).
And finally, EU member states may legislate pre-emptively, before an issue 
becomes the subject of Court jurisprudence at all. Martinsen includes in her book 
the Working Time Directive where codification concerned case law on second-
ary legislation. By treating it largely on a par with the Patient Mobility Directive 
and the Posted Workers Directive, she fails to acknowledge the importance of 
over-constitutionalisation and to capture member states’ limited but differentiated 
ability to correct ECJ jurisprudence through secondary legislation. In the specific 
case of the Working Time Directive, member states would have been able to over-
ride the Court, but they failed to reach legislative agreement with the European 
Parliament. Moreover, the existing directive already allowed generous possibilities 
of opt-out, including opting out of the constraints of case law. By contrast, where 
ECJ case law is constitutionally protected, secondary legislation can never overrule 
primary legal interpretation: legal hierarchy does not allow such ‘modification’ 
and overrule would require a unanimous Treaty change. Against this background 
of constitutionalised policy goals, future studies on the Court’s legislative impact 
should compare more systematically cases in which the EU legislature has to deal 
with jurisprudence based on primary and on secondary law.
(ii) At the member state level, the Court’s influence on domestic legislation 
has long been neglected or underestimated as well. Most Europeanisation and 
compliance studies focus exclusively on the transposition and implementation 
of European secondary legislation (Mastenbroek 2005: 1004). In this context, 
litigation in front of the ECJ or national courts has been analysed as a tool 
for ensuring member state compliance with EU legislation (Panke 2007). By 
contrast, Europeanisation studies largely neglected the ECJ’s case law inter-
preting the Treaties. The prevailing view in the literature was that Court-driven 
‘negative integration’ triggered weaker adjustment pressures for member states 
than positively prescribed EU policies (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 258). Only 
recently has the interest in ‘Europeanisation through law’ grown. According 
to Treib (2014: 13), ‘overcoming the focus on positive integration’ is one of the 
most innovative features of current EU implementation studies.
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Recent studies on Europeanisation through law largely confirm Conant’s 
(2002) thesis of ‘contained compliance’ (Treib 2014: 13), but they also go beyond 
this finding in at least two respects. First, mere neglect is often unsustainable 
or even counter-productive for limiting the domestic impact of the Court’s 
case law. Rather, member state legislatures may have to engage in systematic 
reforms precisely to shield domestic policies from further judicial intervention 
(Blauberger 2012). The underlying political rationale in these instances, then, is 
that ‘it is better to define than to be defined’ (Martinsen 2005: 1049). National 
administrations are particularly averse to the legal uncertainty of ECJ case law 
(Schmidt 2008). When the costs of legal uncertainty get too high, therefore, 
‘pro-activism’ (Martinsen 2005: 1049) or ‘anticipatory obedience’ (Blauberger 
2014) become the more likely political outcomes. Or, in the words of twentieth 
century Italian literature: ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have 
to change’ (Tomasi di Lampedusa 1960: 40).
Secondly, ECJ jurisprudence has another impact on domestic policy- making 
that is difficult to identify, yet highly significant: domestic ‘non-decisions’ 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1963). The Court’s interpretation of EU fundamental 
freedoms constrains the set of domestic policy options that are still considered 
compatible with EU law. For example, the Court constantly holds that ‘though 
in the areas in which the Community does not have competence, the Member 
States remain, in principle, free to lay down the conditions …, they must nev-
ertheless exercise that competence consistently with Community law’ (Case 
C-341/05 Laval, No. 85). As a consequence, even ‘core areas’ (Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs 2014) of national legislative competence are not immune to the 
constraining effect of the Court’s case law. Attempts to guard subsidiarity often 
founder. For example, in the context of the Brexit referendum, the constraints 
that EU law puts on domestic policy were widely discussed, as policy attempts 
to restrict EU migrants’ access to benefits in the UK were heavily constrained 
under ECJ case law (Blauberger and Schmidt forthcoming). This stands in 
stark contrast to the large body of Europeanisation studies assuming that only 
secondary legislation directly impacts national policy-making. Yet compared 
to studying the transposition of EU directives, identifying and tracing this kind 
of domestic ‘non-decisions’ back to ECJ jurisprudence is particularly chal-
lenging and, hence, gets easily neglected (Töller 2010: 429f.). Moreover, what 
makes comparison difficult and obscures general Europeanisation patterns is 
the diversity of domestic policy implications stemming from negative integra-
tion. Compared to specific harmonised EU policies, general Treaty principles 
such as non-restriction or non-discrimination potentially collide with a much 
greater plurality of national policies, i.e. they affect very diverse member state 
policies through possibly similar mechanisms.
In sum, the ECJ’s case law cannot dictate European or national policies, 
but its impact deserves greater attention. If we do not start with unrealis-
tic expectations of a quasi-dictatorial judicial power, we can detect highly 
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significant, yet subtle forms of judicial influence on policy-making in the 
EU’s multi-level system. Rather than prescribing full-scale policies, ECJ case 
law involves considerable legal uncertainty and, thereby, often provides an 
incentive for policy-makers to take legislative action in the first place. Even if 
codification involves a good deal of gap-filling and translation of individual 
judgments into general rules, constitutionalised Court jurisprudence sets 
the frame on which the Commission bases its proposals and may create the 
very need for secondary legislation. And even if national policy-makers typ-
ically try to limit the impact of unwelcome ECJ rulings, ‘containing’ judicial 
influence may require systematic pro-activism. At the same time, domestic 
inaction does not rule out judicial influence either – rather non-decisions 
may constitute the most important, albeit difficult to detect, effect of Court-
driven negative integration.
Conclusion
Recent studies have significantly advanced our understanding of the ECJ. Yet 
when read in the context of the dichotomy between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism these studies easily lead us astray, as it appears that the Court’s 
influence on European integration has been overrated. At the same time, much 
research approaching the EU from a comparative politics perspective fails to 
acknowledge unique features of the EU legal system and the significant policy 
impact of the Court.
It is the contribution of Grimm’s book (2016) to coin the term over- 
constitutionalisation that captures a neglected feature of the Court’s juris-
prudence and its impact on European integration more generally. Studies of 
the Court’s alignment with member state preferences in individual rulings 
underestimate the importance of precedent on subsequent rulings of European 
or domestic courts and, hence, the expansive effect of ECJ jurisprudence over 
time. And the implications of direct effect and supremacy of EU law have been 
largely ignored in EU legislative studies, where existing case law often forms 
the basis of the Commission’s proposals. The over-constitutionalisation of EU 
Treaty law with its many policy goals provides an opportunity structure for 
private actors (Cichowski 2007; Kelemen 2011), the Commission (Blauberger 
and Weiss 2013; Schmidt 2000) and lower courts (Alter 2001; Stone Sweet and 
Stranz 2012) to pursue those policy aims – but it severely constrains member 
state governments to deviate from past policy choices and their interpretation 
by the ECJ.
Note
1.  Our references are based on the German version of Grimm’s monograph the 
English version is forthcoming (2017) with Oxford University Press.
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